Since the mid-1990s, monetary authorities in most large developed countries have backed away from foreign-exchange intervention-buying and selling foreign currencies to infl uence exchange rates. Switzerland's recent experience goes a long way to illustrate why: Foreign-exchange intervention did not afford the Swiss National Bank with a means of systematically affecting the franc independent of Swiss monetary policy, and it left the Bank exposed to foreign-exchange losses. To affect exchange rates, central banks must change their monetary policies.
Before the recent international fi nancial crisis, Switzerland's monetary authority, the Swiss National Bank, had not intervened in the foreign-exchange market since the mid1990s. The Bank's hiatus from such operations ended in 2009, as international investors-seeking safe haven against the ongoing fi nancial storm-moved substantial funds into Swiss francs. Their actions caused the Swiss franc to appreciate, particularly against the euro, and threatened an already weakened Swiss economy with defl ation.
The Swiss National Bank's subsequent actions in the foreign-exchange market met with both failures and successes but served, in the end, to illustrate two established, though often-forgotten, facts: Foreign-exchange interventions cannot systematically infl uence exchange rates independently of a country's monetary policy; and, less obviously, focusing monetary policy on an exchangerate objective can potentially confl ict with price stability. Appreciating the critical correspondence between foreignexchange intervention and monetary policy is crucial for any country contemplating intervention. 
Intervention and Monetary Policy
Intervention refers to purchases or sales of foreign currencies that governments undertake to affect currency exchange rates. This defi nition includes a mechanism-the purchase or sale of foreign exchange-because a lot of different governmental actions infl uence exchange rates, and a motive-to alter exchange rates-because central banks often transact in foreign exchange for other reasons. Some central banks have routinely conducted their domestic monetary policies using purchases and sales of foreign exchange. Most notably, Switzerland did so before 1998 through foreign exchange swaps, a technique explained below (AR 2009, p. 49). 2 When a monetary authority buys or sells foreign exchange, it makes or accepts payment in domestic currency by crediting or debiting commercial banks' reserve accounts at the central bank. Consequently, except for involving foreign currency, the interventions are functionally equivalent to traditional open-market transactions, in that they both add or drain bank reserves. (Reserves are part of a nation's monetary base-a narrow defi nition of money.) Most of these purchases appeared as an increase in the Swiss monetary base, so for the most part, the operation consisted of nonsterilized interventions (fi gure 1).
In April, the Swiss monetary base rose even more sharplyabsent clear indication of further intervention. By then, the Swiss monetary base had doubled in just six months.
Although the franc's depreciation stalled after March 16, it did not appreciate further that year, leaving a net depreciation by year's end (fi gure 2). As the year closed, the Bank was projecting infl ation above 2 percent in early 2012, so with the franc holding steady, the Bank announced that Swiss francs spot and repurchase them forward. In addition, the Bank would repurchase Swiss National Bank bills, which it had sold to drain liquidity from fi nancial markets, and would undertake liquidity-providing repurchase agreements (AR 2011, p. 51).
The announcements did not indicate whether or not the Bank intended to purchase foreign exchange outright, but the Bank's holdings of foreign-exchange reserves increased substantially in August 2011. The Swiss monetary base began to expand, indicating that the Bank had not sterilized its recent foreign-exchange purchases, and the Swiss franc immediately began to depreciate against the euro.
After depreciating nearly 14 percent between August 10 and August 29, 2011, the franc underwent a stunning temporary reversal, climbing more than 6 percent in four days. In response, on September 6, 2011, the Bank announced that it would "no longer tolerate" the franc exchange rate below SF1.20 per euro and that it was "prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities" to maintain this fl oor (AR 2011, p. 38).
After acquiring SF71.5 billion worth of foreign-exchange reserves in August, the Bank added an additional SF26.9 billion worth of foreign-exchange reserves in September 2011. The Swiss monetary base increased by even more in both months, indicating that the monetary authorities had not sterilized these foreign-exchange purchases, but had reinforced the interventions' monetary impact. Since September 2011, the Swiss National Bank has successfully maintained its exchange-rate fl oor against the euro, often through heavy nonsterilized purchases of foreign exchange (AR 2012, p. 34). In doing so, the Bank has allowed its monetary base to more than double since early 2011.
Despite the sharp increase in the monetary base, Switzerland has experienced a mild defl ation since then, while the euro area has seen prices rise. Under the current program, the Swiss franc has depreciated approximately 13 percent on a real basis against the euro, suggesting some improvement in Switzerland's competitive position vis-à-vis the euro area. Still, the Swiss franc remains about 12 percent stronger on a real basis against the euro as compared with early 2009. When the Bank entered into these swap agreements, it immediately bought foreign exchange with francs under a promise to sell the foreign exchange back to the market for Swiss francs at a specifi c future date. The contracts were now reversing, shrinking the Swiss National Bank's balance sheet and pulling Swiss francs from the market (AR 2009, p. 53).
The Swiss National Bank took no other monetary policy actions-for example, engaging in liquidity-providing repurchase operations-to offset these swap reversals. In effect, the Swiss interventions were sterilized.
In early 2010, the European sovereign-debt crisis worsened. Safe-haven infl ows caused the franc to appreciate sharply in the foreign-exchange market. In contrast, the interventions after April 2009 and before August 2011, which did not raise the monetary base, failed to guide the Swiss franc lower against the euro. Instead, the franc appreciated substantially, but unsurprisingly. At best, sterilized intervention can sometimes bump exchange rates onto alternative paths, but only ones that are still consistent with unchanged fundamentals. To alter their exchange rates in a persistent manner, central banks must change moneygrowth rates.
Lesson #2: Nonsterilized Intervention Can Create Policy Dilemmas
Since the Swiss National Bank linked its initial interventions in early 2009 with broader monetary-policy actions and a concern for defl ationary pressures, observers initially wondered what the operations truly represented. Were they, fi rst and foremost, designed to affect the exchange rate, or were they quantitative easing via foreign-asset purchases intended to maintain price stability?
In one respect, the distinction is more illusionary than real. A sharp expansion of the Swiss monetary base caused the Swiss franc initially to depreciate and has proven necessary to maintain a fl oor on the franc's exchange rate with the euro. But how the Swiss National Bank produces this monetary expansion does not matter. There is no theoretical or empirical reason to believe that creating money through the purchase of foreign exchange affects exchange rates any differently than doing so through traditional channels. Conducting monetary policy through foreign-currency operations would only seem necessary if an alternative Swiss franc asset market is not available. Indeed, prior to 1998, the Swiss National Bank conducted monetary policy primarily through foreign-exchange swaps for exactly that reason (AR 2011, p.46).
In another respect, however, the distinction is crucial. Whereas the method for achieving a monetary expansion matters little, the target of the monetary expansion is critical. Pursuing an exchange-rate target with monetary policy can sometimes confl ict with a central bank's mandate for price stability. In general, if an inappropriate domesticmonetary-policy stance is causing the exchange rate to rise or fall, adjusting policy to offset that movement creates no confl ict with price stability. Since early 2009, the Swiss National Bank has often interpreted the franc's appreciation as evidence that Swiss monetary policy was too tight and that defl ation could follow. In such a case, expanding the monetary base to prevent a franc appreciation poses no policy dilemma.
If, however, "real" factors-for example, productivity differentials-or foreign monetary developments are driving exchange rates, then offsetting them through domestic monetary policy can indeed confl ict with price stability. In 2010, when capital fl ight from the euro area drove the Swiss franc's appreciation, the Swiss National Bank nevertheless allowed the monetary base to contract out of concern for future infl ation. Policymakers then seemed to subordinate their concern for the franc's appreciation to their long-term policy goal of price stability. In general, the more a central bank concentrates on exchange-rate stability, the greater are the risks to price stability.
Lesson #3: Collateral Damage Is Possible
A profi t motive generally does not drive central banks' interventions. Profi ts, moreover, can be an imprecise metric for evaluating the success of such operations. Still, central banks typically hope to come out ahead, especially if they believe that their currencies are fundamentally overvalued in relation to the foreign currency that they subsequently acquire.
In early 2011, following heavy sterilized interventions, the Swiss National Bank announced substantial valuation losses on its foreign-exchange portfolio, stemming primarily from the protracted depreciation of the euro against the Swiss franc (AR 2010, p. 112). At this time, foreign assets accounted for approximately 76 percent of the Bank's balance sheet, and roughly 55 percent of these were denominated in euros (AR 2010, p. 66). The Bank's profi ts are a revenue source both for the Swiss federal government and, especially, for the cantons (the states into which Switzerland is divided). Hence, the inability of sterilized intervention to stem the Swiss franc's appreciation against the euro infl icted collateral damage on governmental budgets.
Still, the fundamental problem after April 2009 and before August 2011 was not that the Bank's intervention left it with an exposure to foreign-exchange losses; the fundamental problem was the inability of sterilized intervention to stem the Swiss franc's appreciation. Nonsterilized intervention stood a better chance of creating the desired outcome but would have left a foreign-exchange exposure on the Bank's balance sheet. Expanding the monetary base to stabilize exchange rates through the acquisition of domestic assets-if they are suffi ciently available-can affect the exchange rate while avoiding an exposure.
Losing Favor
Since the mid-1990s, monetary authorities in most large developed countries have backed away from foreignexchange intervention. Switzerland's recent experience goes a long way to illustrate why: Foreign-exchange intervention did not afford the Swiss National Bank with a means of systematically affecting the franc independent of Swiss monetary policy, and it left the Bank exposed to foreignexchange losses. To affect exchange rates central banks must change their monetary policies. Any monetary authority contemplating intervention should consider the recent Swiss experience.
